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Tie Votes and the 2016 Supreme Court
Vacancy
Justin R. Pidot

†

On February 13, 2016, Justice Antonin Scalia died, ending
his three-decade reign as leader of the conservative wing of the
1
Supreme Court. He was renowned for his unyielding,
combative style, often offering withering criticism of those who
2
disagreed with his views. That approach produced mixed
results. He was the most-written about Justice in the 21st
3
4
Century, but his derisive tone limited his effectiveness,
preventing him from assembling an enduring or consistent
majority in favor of the conservative jurisprudence he
5
championed.
† Associate Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I
would like to thank Alan Chen, Lee Epstein, Nancy Leong, Margaret Kwoka,
Alan Morrison, and Adam Steinman for sharing ideas with me that
contributed to this essay. I would also like to thank my research assistant
Courtney McVean for her help creating the database of cases involving tie
votes that serves as the basis for my historical analysis. Copyright © 2016 by
Justin R. Pidot.
1. See Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies
at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/
antonin-scalia-death.html?_r=0.
2. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,
560 U.S. 702, 723–24 (2013) (“Justice Kennedy's other point—that we will
have to decide when the claim of a judicial taking must be asserted—hardly
presents an awe-inspiring prospect. These, and all the other ‘difficulties,’
‘difficult questions,’ and ‘practical considerations’ that Justice Kennedy
worries may perhaps stand in the way of recognizing a judicial taking, are
either nonexistent or insignificant.”) (citations omitted).
3. Benjamin Morris, How Scalia Became the Most Influential
Conservative Jurist Since the New Deal, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb. 14, 2016),
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-scalia-became-the-most-influentialconservative-jurist-since-the-new-deal/.
4. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia Dies
at 79; Ardent Conservative Fought Liberalism’s Tide, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 13,
2016),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-antonin-scalia-20160213story.html.
5. For a discussion of ebb and flow of the conservative jurisprudence
Justice Scalia advocated for in two doctrinal settings, constitutional standing
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During the Scalia years, an unprecedented proportion of
6
the cases before the Court were decided by a single vote. The
7
public also increasingly viewed the Court as politicized, and in
2015, half of Americans disapproved of the Supreme Court’s
8
performance.
With the Court so divided, Justice Scalia’s death could
herald in an era of deadlock in which the Justices divide evenly
in a string of controversial, high-profile cases. Perhaps the
Court is heading in that direction. As of now, three cases have
involved tie votes, the most in decades. One of those cases,
9
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association,
likely
constitutes the most high-profile case to involve a tie vote in
recent memory.
Other evidence suggests, however, that the Justices may
be responding to the specter of tie votes by forging compromise,
however temporary, to postpone resolution of the issues that
divide them. In at least two instances, the Court appears to
have gone to significant lengths to avoid evenly dividing. That
pattern, if it holds, reflects the history of tie votes in the
Supreme Court. While the prospect of tie votes has caused
much hand-ringing, they have been rare and relatively
insignificant.
This essay considers both the history of tie votes in the
Supreme Court and the current situation facing the Justices. It
explains the doctrine attached to tie votes and the reasons they
occur, and it provides a preview of an empirical study I
performed of all tie votes that occurred between 1925 and 2015,
10
which will be published later this year. This essay also
examines the three cases that have involved tie votes that have
emerged so far in October Term 2015, and two other cases in
and regulatory takings, see Justin R. Pidot, Fees, Expenditures and the
Takings Clause, 41 ECOLOGY L.Q. 131, 139–42 (2014); Justin R. Pidot, The
Invisibility of Jurisdictional Procedure and Its Consequences, 64 FLA. L. REV.
1405, 1413–14 (2012).
6. See David Paul Kuhn, The Incredible Polarization and Politicization of
the Supreme Court, ATLANTIC (June 29, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2012/06/the-incredible-polarization-and-politicization-of-thesupreme-court/259155/.
7. Id.
8. Justin McCarthy, Disapproval of Supreme Court Edges to New High,
GALLUP (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/185972/disapprovalsupreme-court-edges-new-high.aspx.
9. 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016).
10. See Justin R. Pidot, Tie Votes in the Supreme Court, 101 MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016).
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which the Court appears to have implemented strategies to
avoid ties.
The Senate appears unlikely to confirm a replacement for
11
Justice Scalia anytime soon. The Justices may, if they so
choose, use this prolonged vacancy as an opportunity to explore
new methods for resolving cases that evenly divide them. Such
methods could address, at least modestly, the public’s
perception that the Court is intractably polarized.
I. THE HISTORY OF TIE VOTES
Before turning to the tie votes of the current eight-member
Court, this Part provides historical context for tie votes in the
Supreme Court. This discussion examines the doctrine and
form of the equally divided court, the circumstances that result
in ties, and the relative frequency and importance of such
decisions. In providing this analysis, I draw upon a dataset of
12
the 164 tie votes that occurred between 1925 and 2015.
A. THE DOCTRINE AND FORM OF TIE VOTES
The Court has a well-established rule that governs
circumstances where the Justices evenly divide, which dates
13
back to the late 18th Century. If the Justices divide evenly,
the decision of the lower court is affirmed—either in its entirety
or with respect to the issue that divided the Justices—but no
14
Supreme Court precedent is created. The Supreme Court
typically announces that it has deadlocked by issuing a per
curium order stating simply “[t]he judgment is affirmed by an

11. See Harper Neidig, No Hearing for Obama’s Supreme Court Nominee,
McConnell Says, THE HILL (Mar. 16, 2016, 12:04 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/
blog-briefing-room/news/273230-mcconnell-no-hearing-for-garland.
12. See Pidot, supra note 10.
13. See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 409 (1792); see also United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942).
14. See, e.g., Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 234 n.7
(1987) (“Of course, an affirmance by an equally divided Court is not entitled to
precedential weight.”); Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 110 (1868).
The rule governing equally divided courts applies only where the Justices are
divided evenly on the correct result, rather than divided on the rationale for a
result. In the latter case, a majority of the Justices would agree on the
appropriate resolution of the case or issue and lower courts would ascertain
the rule emerging from the case under the framework established by Marks v.
United States. 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977); see also Justin Marceau, Plurality
Decisions: Upward-Flowing Precedent and Acoustic Separation, 45 CONN. L.
REV. 933 (2013) (examining the rule the Court created in Marks).
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equally divided Court.” Of the 164 tie votes that occurred
16
between 1925 and 2015, 149 were of this form.
The rule governing tie votes arose at a time when parties
17
had a right to appeal cases to the Supreme Court. Because the
Court had an obligation to resolve those appeals, the Justices
needed a workable rule to address circumstances where they
deadlocked. While the Court continues to apply the same rule
today, the necessity from which the rule arose has all but
disappeared. Since 1925, Congress has consistently reduced the
18
mandatory docket of the Court. Only one of the 164 cases that
involved a tie vote since 1925 would arise under the Court’s
19
mandatory docket today. As a result, the Court could deploy—
and as I will discuss below perhaps has deployed— alternative
procedures to dispose of cases in which the Justices divide
evenly. For example, rather than announcing a tie vote, the
Court could dismiss the writ of certiorari that gives rise to
Supreme Court jurisdiction as improvidently granted, a process
20
typically referred to as a “DIG.” Resolving a case through a
DIG would have precisely the same effect as affirming by an
equally divided court, but would allow the Justices to act in
concert to resolve the case, potentially creating a more
cooperative spirit on the Court. A DIG would also dispose of the
case without the need for the Court to publicly proclaim that
the Justices have deadlocked.
B. THE CIRCUMSTANCES GIVING RISE TO TIE VOTES
Because an odd number of Justices sit on the Supreme
21
Court, tie votes are relatively rare. They can, however, arise
in two situations.
15. See, e.g., Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011).
16. For a detailed examination of other forms in which tie votes can occur,
see Pidot, supra note 10, at Part III.
17. See DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 1 (1980).
18. See Bennett Boskey & Eugene Gressman, The Supreme Court Bids
Farewell to Mandatory Appeals, 121 FED. RULES DECISIONS 81, 87 (1988).
19. See Pidot, supra note 10, at Part II.
20. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine & Rafael Gely, The Supreme Court and
the Sophisticated Use of DIGs, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 155, 155 (2010). This
acronym is the one commonly used to refer to the court dismissing a writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted. See id. at 155 n.2.
21. Since the Judiciary Act of 1869, 16 Stat. 44, eight Associate Justices
and one Chief Justice have constituted the Supreme Court. See Peter G. Fish,
Justices, Number of, 550, 550 in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Kermit L. Hall, et al. eds., 2d. ed. 2005). Since
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First, a Justice may recuse herself because of a conflict of
interest. For example, Justice Elena Kagan has recused herself
from all cases that came before the U.S. Solicitor General’s
22
Office during her tenure as Solicitor General. While that
decision has resulted in dozens of recusals across several
Supreme Court terms, and therefore dozens of cases decided by
23
eight Justices, only two tie votes have resulted. It may seem
surprising that such a large number of recusals by one of the
Court’s more liberal justices led to so few tie votes, but this is in
keeping with history. A study by Ryan Black and Lee Epstein
found that between 1986 and 2003, only eleven tie votes
24
occurred due to discretionary recusals.
Notwithstanding the rarity of recusals leading to ties, the
prospect of an equally divided Court has led modern Justices to
recuse themselves only reluctantly. The Justices released a
policy on recusal in 1993 that explained “[e]ven one
unnecessary recusal impairs the functioning of the Court. . . .
In this Court, where the absence of one Justice cannot be made
up by another, needless recusal deprives litigants of the nine
Justices to which they are entitled, produces the possibility of
an even division on the merits of the case, and has a distorting
25
effect upon the certiorari process . . . .”

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s famous “court packing plan,” there has
been no serious effort to change the number of Justices on the Supreme Court.
See Justin R. Pidot, Jurisdictional Procedure, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21–22
(2012).
22. During her first term on the Court, Justice Kagan recused herself in
twenty-eight of the seventy-five cases before the Court. Stephen Wermiel,
SCOTUS for Law Students: Justice Kagan’s Recusals, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 9,
2012, 9:50 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/scotus-for-law-studentssponsored-by-bloomberg-law-justice-kagans-recusals/.
23. See Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011); Costco
Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010).
24. Ryan Black & Lee Epstein, Recusals and the “Problem” of an Equally
Divided Supreme Court, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 75, 92 (2005).
25. Supreme Court of the United States, Statement of Recusal Policy
(Nov. 1, 1993), http://eppc.org/docLib/20110106_RecusalPolicy23.pdf. Chief
Justice John Roberts readopted the 1993 policy when he assumed his position
on the Court. See Lyle Denniston, Roberts’ Recusal Policy, SCOTUSBLOG
(Sept. 30, 2005, 4:54 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2005/09/roberts-recusalpolicy/. Justices have expressed similar concerns in denying motions to
disqualify; Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 838 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., denying
motion for disqualification); see also Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of
Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 915 (Scalia, J., denying motion for disqualification);
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, An Open Discussion with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
36 CONN. L. REV. 1033, 1038–39 (2004) (discussing the Court’s policy that a
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Second, a vacancy can leave the Court with an even
number of Justices. Retirements and resignations do not,
however, always create such vacancies. Some Justices, like
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, condition their resignation on
26
the confirmation of a replacement Justice.
The death of a sitting Justice is, of course, certain to result
in at least a temporary vacancy. Almost half of individuals that
have served as Justices on the Supreme Court (50 of 112
27
individuals) have died during their service. The frequency of
such deaths, however, has, dwindled over time. Only ten
Justices have died in office since 1925, and only Chief Justice
William Rehnquist and Justice Scalia have died in office since
28
1970.
The length of vacancies—whether created by retirement or
death—has also decreased. During the 19th Century, nine
vacancies remained unfilled for more than three-hundred days,
and the longest vacancy, which occurred in the 1840s, lasted
29
841 days. The duration of vacancies has in general become
shorter and more consistent. The average duration of the most
30
recent fifteen vacancies was just 55 days. Only the vacancy
created by Justice Lewis Powell’s retirement lasted for more
than 200 days; Justice Anthony Kennedy joined the Court 237
31
days after Justice Powell retired, but that delay occurred
because the Senate failed to confirm then-Judge Robert Bork,
requiring two confirmation processes to unfold before a
32
replacement was selected.

Justice will not recuse themselves from a case in which a law firm the Justice
is associated with represents one of the parties).
26. See William Branigan et al., Supreme Court Justice O’Connor Resigns,
WASH. POST (July 1, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2005/07/01/AR2005070100653.html.
27. See List of Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Justices_of_the_Supreme_
Court_of_the_United_States (last visited July 6, 2016).
28. Id.
29. Drew Desilver, Long Supreme Court Vacancies Used to Be More
Common, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.pewresearch
.org/fact-tank/2016/02/26/long-supreme-court-vacancies-used-to-be-morecommon/.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Andrew Cohen, The Sad Legacy of Robert Bork, ATLANTIC (Dec.
19, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/12/the-sad-legacyof-robert-bork/266456/.
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C. THE FREQUENCY AND IMPORTANCE OF TIE VOTES
Between 1925 and 2015, tie votes were rare, occurring an
average of less than two times per term. Perhaps because
vacancies have become increasingly rare, and Justices have
become increasingly reluctant to recuse themselves, this
number has dwindled over time. In the twenty-five year period
between 1986 and 2010, only twenty-one cases involved a tie
33
vote.
Despite the rarity of tie votes, commentators and even the
Justices themselves express concern that tie votes may create
confusion and non-uniformity of federal law. While disagreeing
with that assessment themselves, Professors Lisa McElroy and
Michael Dorf have explained that “it could be argued that even
34
one 4–4 split can be harmful.” In denying a motion seeking his
recusal, Justice Rehnquist wrote “affirmance of [conflicting
lower court decisions] . . . by an equally divided Court would lay
down ‘one rule in Athens, and another in Rome,’ with a
35
vengeance.” Upon his retirement, Justice John Paul Stevens
also expressed concern about tie votes, reportedly suggesting
that the prospect that a recusal might result in a tie votes was
of sufficient moment to justify legislation providing for
36
appointment of a substitute Justice.
Examination of twenty-one cases between 1986 and 2010
suggests that tie votes do not, however, result in a prolonged
37
lack of uniformity in federal law. Some of those cases involved
no split of authority among the lower courts and in others
either the Supreme Court resolved such a split in relatively
short order in a subsequent case or the lower courts themselves
reached a consensus. Moreover, the federal judicial system is
designed precisely to facilitate non-uniformity, which in
essence involves doctrinal experimentation as the judges in
38
different lower courts reach different conclusions.
The
33. See Pidot, supra note 10, at Part IV.B.
34. Lisa T. McElroy & Michael C. Dorf, Coming Off the Bench: Legal and
Policy Implications of Proposals to Allow Retired Justices to Sit by Designation
on the Supreme Court, 61 DUKE L.J. 81, 95 (2011).
35. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 838 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., denying
motion for disqualification).
36. 156 CONG. REC. S7791 (Sept. 29, 2010) (Statement of Senator Patrick
Leahy).
37. See Pidot, supra note 10, at Part IV.B.
38. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remembering Justice White, 74 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1283, 1285 (2003) (describing percolation of issues in lower
courts).
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Supreme Court also often declines to review cases that involve
splits of authority among lower courts, and there is no reason
that the often-temporary extension of such non-uniformity
39
caused by tie votes should be particularly troublesome.
D. THE DANGER OF TIE VOTES
Data about tie votes reveal that they have been both
relatively rare and doctrinally inconsequential. That does not
40
mean, however, they are unimportant.
Tie votes may threaten the public’s perception of the
Supreme Court, particularly at the present moment when the
public already views the Court as highly politicized. An order
affirming by equal division equates to an admission that the
Justices have failed to fulfill their obligation to resolve a case
before them and they have done so because they have been
unable to compromise.
Additionally, cognitive psychology suggests that tie votes
may create at least some risk that Justices will become
entrenched in their views, prejudging future cases that present
the same issue. This effect, sometimes referred to as the lock-in
effect, occurs when individuals become increasingly committed
to a position or viewpoint after resources have been expended
41
based on their expression of that position or viewpoint. The
lock-in effect is by no means absolute, but on the margins it
may skew the decisions of Justices after a tie vote has occurred.
Finally, in rare circumstances a tie vote in the Supreme
Court may effectively resolve a legal issue for the nation. This
can occur when federal law contains an exclusive review
provision, vesting only one lower court with jurisdiction over a
42
particular issue. Because a tie vote will affirm that decision, it
will leave in place binding authority in the only court in the
country that can consider the issue. For example, a deadlocked
Supreme Court decision in the challenge to the Clean Power
Plan would effectively make the eventual D.C. Circuit’s
decision binding nationwide because the Plan cannot be
43
challenged in any other lower court. The same result would
39. See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567
(2008).
40. See Pidot, supra note 10, at Part V.
41. See, e.g., Kevin J. Lynch, The Lock-In Effect of Preliminary
Injunctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 779, 783–84 (2014).
42. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b).
43. See West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016).
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occur if the Supreme Court divided evenly in a case where a
lower court issued a nationwide injunction. For example, a
deadlock in United States v. Texas would resolve the legality of
the Obama Administration’s policy to defer deportation for
certain individuals violating federal immigration law for the
nation because the lower court enjoined implementation of that
44
policy everywhere in the Country.
II. TIE VOTES DURING THE SCALIA VACANCY
The Supreme Court is in the midst of what could be a
prolonged period in which it will be made up of only eight
Justices. This comes at a time when the Court has been as
polarized as at any point in modern history. While tie votes
have been of little historical moment, current conditions could
lay the groundwork for an anomalous period in which a
significant number of important and high-profile cases equally
divide the Justices. Such a result could significantly magnify
the dangers posed by tie votes, particularly to the perceived
legitimacy of the Supreme Court.
The Court’s October Term 2015 opinions that have postdated Justice Scalia’s death suggest, however, that the Court
may be actively seeking to avoid resolving cases by equal
division. While three decisions have involved tie votes, the most
in any term in recent decades, in two other cases the Court has
deployed delaying tactics to postpone resolution of contentious
legal issues. While the Court does not appear to have DIGged
any cases because of the prospect of a tie vote, the strategies it
has used have produced similar results.
A. TIE VOTES AFTER JUSTICE SCALIA
So far, the Court has equally divided in three cases in the
wake of Justice Scalia’s death. While that number exceeds the
number of ties in any year since 1989, it does not dramatically
45
depart from historical trends. Strikingly, however, one of the
cases in which the Court evenly divided was among the most-

44. Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136
S. Ct. 906 (2016). [Editor's note: for further analysis on the recent outcome of
this case, please see the Epilogue section below.]
45. For example, two cases involved tie votes in 2011: American Electric
Power, Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) and Flores-Villar v. United
States, 131. S. Ct. 2312 (2011).
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watched cases of the term, something which does depart from
historical trends.
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association may be the
46
highest-profile tie vote in recent history. The case involved the
ability of public-sector unions to collect a fee to pay for
collective-bargaining activities from employees that declined to
47
join the union, a practice the Supreme Court had approved of
48
in the 1977 decision Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.
Prior to Friedrichs, two recent decisions undermined Abood,
each of which made it more difficult for public-sector unions to
49
collect fees from non-union members. Conservatives hoped
that the Court would find an opportunity in Friedrichs to
50
reverse Abood entirely. The questions Justice Scalia asked at
the oral argument suggest that, had he lived, conservatives
51
may well have secured the victory for which they hoped. In
the wake of Justice Scalia’s death, however, the Friedrichs case
ended with a tie vote.
A second case, Hawkins v. Community Bank of Raymore,
was resolved in its entirety by a tie vote. The case involved a
Federal Reserve regulation interpreting a provision of the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) that prohibits
discrimination against people seeking loans on the basis of
52
marital status. The regulation interprets that prohibition as
making it illegal for lenders to require a spouse to guarantee a
53
loan taken out by the other spouse. Despite the regulation, the
banks involved in the case required the husbands of Valarie

46. See, e.g., Josh Gerstein, 5 Cases to Watch as Supreme Court Term
Begins, POLITICO (Oct. 4, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/10/
supreme-court-abortion-obamacare-214400.
47. See Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 2013 WL 9825479, at *1–2 (Dec.
5 2013, C.D.Cal.), summarily aff’d 2014 WL 10076847 (Nov. 18, 2014, 9th
Cir.).
48. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
49. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014); Knox v. Service
Employees Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 227 (2012).
50. See, e.g., James Sherk, Supreme Court Case May Bring Workplace
Freedom to Government Employees, NATIONAL REVIEW (Jan. 5, 2016), http://
www.nationalreview.com/corner/429250/government-employee-unionssupreme-court-case-friedrichs-v-california-teachers.
51. See Charlotte Garden, What Will Become of Public-Sector Unions
Now?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2016/02/scalia-friedrichs/462936/.
52. See Hawkins v. Community Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937, 940 (8th
Cir. 2014).
53. Id.
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Hawkins and Janice Patterson to guarantee loans issued to
54
their wives. Both the district court and court of appeals held
that the Federal Reserve’s regulation improperly interpreted
the ECOA, and that therefore the guarantees offered by the
55
husbands were enforceable. While commentators at the oral
argument believed the Justices were likely to agree with the
56
lower courts and find the regulation invalid, the Court ended
57
up dividing equally.
Finally, Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt
involved a tie vote on a significant preliminary issue in the
case, although the Justices were ultimately able to dispose of it
58
on a secondary issue of little importance. The case involved a
Nevada taxpayer suing the Franchise Tax Board of California
59
in a Nevada court. In a 1979 decision, the Supreme Court had
held that state sovereign immunity did not bar one state from
60
being sued in the courts of another state, and in Franchise
Tax Board, California asked the Supreme Court to overrule
61
that decision. At argument, it appeared likely that a majority
of the Justices, including Justice Scalia, were poised to grant
62
California’s request. Instead, the Court divided equally on
that question. Six Justices then held that the Nevada court had
erred by awarding damages against California that were
greater than the court could have awarded against Nevada
63
itself, a decision of little lasting importance.
B. TIE VOTE AVOIDANCE AFTER JUSTICE SCALIA
In at least two cases, the Court appeared to have deployed
a delaying tactic to avoid a tie vote. While the Court has yet to
54. Id. at 939.
55. Id. at 941.
56. See, e.g., Ronald Mann, Argument Analysis: Justices Dubious of
Longstanding Protections for Spouses Forced to Guarantee Each Other’s
Debts, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 6, 2015, 9:21 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/
10/argument-analysis-justices-dubious-of-longstanding-protections-forspouses-forced-to-guarantee-each-others-debts/.
57. Hawkins v. Community Bank of Raymore, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016).
58. 136 S. Ct. 1277 (2016).
59. Id. at 1279–80.
60. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
61. 136 S. Ct. at 1279.
62. Lyle Denniston, Argument Analysis: Seeking Two-Century-Old
Guidance, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 7, 2015, 3:33 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2015/12/argument-analysis-seeking-two-century-old-guidance/.
63. Id. at 1281–82.
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DIG a case because the Justices are poised to evenly divide, the
strategies they have deployed have had the similar effect of
delaying resolution of a legal issue that appeared to divide the
Justices, but without requiring the Court to issue an order
affirming by equal division.
In Zubik v. Burwell, the Court managed to avoid a tie vote
64
in another of the most-watched cases of the term. The case,
which involved seven separate lower court decisions, involved a
65
challenge to the Affordable Care Act (the “ACA”). Specifically,
religious organizations argued that the provisions of the ACA
that enabled them to opt out of providing contraceptive
66
coverage to their employees violated their religious freedom.
Argument in the case occurred after Justice Scalia’s death, and
67
the Court appeared headed toward a tie vote. The Court then
issued an order requesting additional briefing on potential
alternative means of accommodating the religious views of the
68
plaintiffs. After supplemental briefs had been filed, the Court
issued a per curium order declining to address the merits.
Rather, the Court remanded to the lower courts to consider the
alternatives that the parties had discussed. In so doing, the
Court stated that it “express[ed] no view on the merits of the
69
cases.” In other words, rather than dividing equally and
reinforcing perceptions of the politicization and polarization of
the Court, the Justices issued a unanimous order delaying their
consideration of the merits of challenges to the opt-out
provisions.
The Court deployed a similar strategy in Spokeo, Inc. v.
70
Robins. The case presented the Court with an opportunity to
clarify the type of injury necessary for a plaintiff to have
standing to sue in federal court when Congress creates
64. See Jennifer Haberkorn, Supreme Court Asks for Obamacare Birth
Control Compromise, POLITICO (May 16, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/
2016/05/supreme-court-demands-compromise-on-obamacare-contraceptionrule-223214.
65. See Lyle Denniston, The Legal Fate of Obamacare: Round 4,
SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 11, 2015, 6:07 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/12/
the-legal-fate-of-obamacare-round-4/.
66. No. 14-1418 (May 16, 2016).
67. Lyle Denniston, Argument Analysis: On New Health Care Case, a
Single Word May Tell It All, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 23, 2016, 3:49 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/03/argument-analysis-on-new-health-carecase-a-single-word-may-tell-it-all/.
68. See Order, Zubik, No. 14-1418 (March 29, 2016).
69. Zubik, No. 14-1418, slip op. at 4 (May 16, 2016).
70. No. 13-1339 slip op. (May 16, 2016).
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statutory rights. A decision in the case requiring proof of
concrete actual injury to a plaintiff invoking a statutory right
had the potential to foreclose many class-action lawsuits and
substantially limit Congress’s ability to create statutory
72
rights. The Court again declined to address that contentious
legal issue and, instead, six Justices joined an opinion finding
that the lower courts analysis was “incomplete” and, therefore,
a remand was appropriate for the lower court to reconsider the
73
standing issue. In other words, in Spokeo a majority of the
Justices again chose to pursue a strategy that avoided a
decision affirming by equal division and instead chose to
postpone consideration of a contentious legal issue.
CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia exerted considerable influence on American
law during his time on the Court. He also left behind an eightmember Court viewed by the public as polarized and
politicized. Undoubtedly, the living Justices remain deeply
divided. They, however, may be finding common ground. The
specter of evenly dividing in high-profile cases at a time when
large segments of the public have come to view the Court as a
political, rather than legal, institution, may be encouraging the
Justices to find new, better ways to proceed. Two cases decided
this year seem to provide fodder for optimism, as the Court has
issued orders postponing the resolution of controversial issues
without reaching a deadlock. History suggests that the cases
resolved by tie votes remain unimportant and uncommon. With
sufficient will and creativity, the Court can continue that
tradition.
EPILOGUE
As this essay goes live, my optimism about compromise on
the Court has soured considerably. On June 23, 2016, the Court
announced that it had deadlocked in United States v. Texas and
Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw

71. See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413–14 (9th Cir. 2014).
72. See Mark Joseph Stern, SCOTUS Misses an Opportunity to Gut Class
Actions and Consumer Privacy Laws, SLATE (May 16, 2015, 12:56 PM), http://
www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/05/16/spokeo_v_robins_spares_class_act
ions_and_consumer_privacy.html.
73. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, No. 13-1339, slip op. at 2 (May 16, 2016).
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Indians. The significance of these tie votes is more than
numeric, although five tie votes in what amounts to about
75
three-quarters of a Supreme Court term is a striking number,
and the term is not yet over. The tie vote in United States v.
Texas is particularly striking to me. The case involves a
signature initiative of the Obama Administration and affects
the lives of millions of people living in the United States. And
as I discussed in my Essay, the lower court also issued a
nation-wide injunction that purports to bind the federal
government throughout the country, rather than an order
limited to the states within the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit.
The decision does involve only a preliminary injunction, and as
a result the case may ultimately return to the Supreme Court
for a resolution of the merits of the case, hopefully after a ninth
Justice has been appointed. Nonetheless, a deadlock that
affects so many people related to an issue as highly contentious
as immigration law may have long-lasting reverberations. This
is particularly true because, when coupled with the tie vote in
Friedrichs, the Court has now failed to resolve two of the
biggest cases on its docket. As a result, I suspect that the public
will, at least for a while, no longer view tie votes as anomalous.
I also suspect these decisions—or really, lack of decisions—will
significantly increase the erosion of public trust in the
institution of the Supreme Court.

74. United States v. Texas, No. 15-674, slip op. at 1 (June 23, 2016) (per
curiam); Dollar General Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, No. 13-1496,
slip op. at 1 (June 23, 2016).
75. See Statistics, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/statistics/
(last visited July 6, 2016).

